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This paper presents a case study examining how accounting and accountability processes 
facilitate the sharing of different forms of knowledge in non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) contexts. The paper derives its primary insights from in-depth interviews with thirty 
NGO fieldworkers working and delivering development aid in Northern Ghana, Africa. We 
demonstrate how fieldworkers value both explicit, codifieable knowledge (referred to as 
‘operational knowledge’) and contextualised, tacit knowledge (referred to as ‘situational 
knowledge’). The sharing of situational knowledge in support of operational knowledge by 
fieldworkers within NGO-funder accounting and accountability processes is perceived as 
crucial for optimising the use of development aid. However, despite funder encouragement, 
fieldworkers refrain from sharing situational knowledge within these processes. This is 
influenced by the perceived coercive nature of the accounting and accountability processes. 
These processes offer fieldworkers limited flexibility and create uncertainty by failing to 
inform them of the consequences arising from sharing operational and situational knowledge. 
The findings develop prior work highlighting the tensions between global control and local 
flexibility in NGO-funder accounting and accountability processes. We show how the value 
attached to different types of knowledge influences how these tensions play out. The findings 
also challenge prior work suggesting that NGO fieldworkers attach little relevance to 
operational knowledge required by funders in accounting and accountability reports. Our 
analysis implies a need to develop more enabling NGO-funder accounting and accountability 
processes to enhance the effectiveness of development aid assistance. We argue that this will 
require greater fieldworker involvement in the development of performance measures, more 
frequent face-to-face funder-fieldworker interaction, and more timely feedback from funders 
to fieldworkers on how knowledge shared within accounting and accountability processes is 
used.  
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This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the role of accounting and 
accountability processes in facilitating the sharing of key knowledge within non governmental 
development organization (NGDO) contexts. NGDOs typically receive aid funding from a 
number of governmental and private donors and channel this into providing welfare and other 
aid services to disadvantaged communities in developing countries (Ferguson, Huysman, and 
Soekijad 2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). We present the results of a field study 
conducted among thirty NGDO fieldworkers working and delivering development aid within 
impoverished communities in Northern Ghana, Africa. These fieldworkers are the key 
individuals involved in deploying and assessing the use of development aid at local 
community/grassroots level (Awio, Northcott, and Lawrence 2011). The data analysis focuses 
on the experiences and perceptions of the fieldworkers regarding the accounting and 
accountability processes that they use to share different forms of knowledge with funders. It is 
through this sharing of knowledge that funders may become aware of the effectiveness with 
which their funding has been used. As the effective sharing of knowledge is at the heart of the 
empirical issues under investigation, a knowledge sharing theoretical framework is drawn 
upon and adapted to the NGDO context to inform analysis of the data. 
The paper’s aims are important given the immense scale and potential impact of 
Official Development Assistance which is provided by governments and other private 
agencies, such as NGOs (non governmental organisations), to support the economic, 
environmental, social and political development of developing countries. Around 80 to 85 per 
cent of this assistance comes from government sources with the remainder emanating from 
NGOs, foundations and development charities (OECD 2009). In 2010, net Official 
Development Assistance from governments of the 23 countries that are members of the 
OECD’s (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Development 
Assistance Committee came to US$128.7 billion, the highest level ever1. Canada was the 
seventh largest contributor of aid, with the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) donating US$87 million to Ghana in 2009 (OECD, 2011). Ghana is also one of the 20 
‘countries of focus’ within the Canadian government’s Aid Effectiveness Agenda (CIDA 
2011). It is widely claimed that the effective deployment of this aid, often via NGOs, can 
                                                           
1 Net Official Development Assistance as a share of the combined gross national income (GNI) of Development 
Assistance Committee member countries was 0.32%, higher than any other year since 1992 (OECD 2011). The 23 
Development Assistance Committee member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (USA). 
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dramatically alter the life experiences of hundreds of millions of the poorest inhabitants in 
developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008; United Nations 2011)2. Thus, a marginal 
increase in the effectiveness with which these funds are transformed into aid provision 
through the delivery of NGO services can potentially have a significant impact on the lives of 
many aid recipients (KPMG 2010). Given that accounting and accountability processes are 
seen as essential to assessing the effectiveness with which this aid is spent (Ebrahim 2005; 
KPMG 2010), we are motivated to better understand the possibilities and limitations of these 
processes in governing the effective spending of this aid.  
The paper’s aims are timely given the increasing international calls for improved 
accountability with respect to the effectiveness of aid deployment (CIDA 2011; KPMG 2010; 
OECD 2011). For example, in the context of the ongoing global economic turmoil the 
effectiveness of development aid spending is being scrutinised more closely than ever before 
(KPMG 2010). The recent Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness3, held in Busan, 
Korea, prioritised the importance of accounting for aid effectiveness and encouraged greater 
accountability between donors and their partners in individual countries who distribute 
donations on their behalf. It also called for accounting and accountability processes to develop 
more tailored output and outcome indicators to suit specific country contexts (Fourth High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2011, 4-5; The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and 
Accra Agenda for Action 2011). While this focus on improving accounting and accountability 
                                                           
2 The most recent publicly available figure for the number of people living on incomes below the World Bank 
poverty level of US$1.25 per day is 1.4 billion. However, while this figure is the latest available, it should be noted 
that it relates to the year 2005. The World Bank’s poverty projections for 2015 indicate that this figure should fall 
below 900 million by 2015. Key areas of progress in development in the past decade have involved a marked 
increase in access to education, improved HIV prevention, and greater access to cleaner drinking water. However, 
in urban areas in particular, poor sanitation and unsafe drinking water remain serious problems (United Nations 
2011). A number of the NGDOs studied in this paper seek to improve education and sanitation and drinking water 
for local communities in Northern Ghana. Much ODA is now targeted at achieving the United Nations (UN) 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs represent a set of targets, agreed by the UN at a series of 
international summit meetings. They identify some of the main causes of extreme poverty worldwide and have 
come to underpin the poverty reduction policies and activities of many developed nations. The MDGs require the 
international community to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote 
gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. 
3 The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was held between 29 November and 1 December 2011 in 
Busan, South Korea. It followed meetings held in Rome, Paris and Accra that attempted to change aid relationships 
between donors and their partners to encourage greater international development co-
operation. Five principles emerged from these meetings which encouraged: local ownership of development 
interventions; the alignment of development programmes around a country’s development strategy; the 
harmonisation of practices to reduce transaction costs; the avoidance of fragmented efforts; and the creation of 
results frameworks. Government ministers from developing and donor countries, government representatives, 
parliamentarians, civil society organizations such as NGOs and private sector representatives met at the Fourth 
High-Level Forum and agreed a new framework for development co-operation. See: 




with respect to country-level aid effectiveness is important, little attention has been afforded 
to the need for establishing suitable accounting and accountability processes at individual 
project or micro levels where NGOs often take responsibility for the delivery of aid among 
local communities. Specific accounting and accountability processes at this level can have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness with which development aid is deployed (Goddard and 
Assad 2006; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010; Rahaman et al. 2010). The tendency to neglect 
detailed analysis at this level in international public policy debates as well as in the NGO 
accounting and accountability academic literature further motivates our research focus on 
micro-level NGO-funder accounting and accountability processes.  
The paper seeks to contribute to the literature by extending and developing prior 
research investigating NGO accounting and accountability processes. First, it responds to 
Rahaman et al.’s (2010) call for researchers to examine how accounting can and should be 
used within social-purpose settings to address social problems in the African continent (see 
also, Rahaman 2010). We place special attention on the extent to which the accounting and 
accountability processes studied exhibit enabling or coercive characteristics as part of 
attempts to address the tensions that can exist between the costs of delivering aid ineffectively 
and the costs of misused funds (Rahaman et al. 2010, 1123; see also, Adlers and Borys 1996; 
Ahrens and Chapman 2004; Wouters and Roijmans 2011). By mobilising perspectives from 
the knowledge sharing literature, the paper also takes up Rahaman et al.’s (2010) call for 
researchers to apply insights from other domains to examine accounting and accountability 
processes in these social-purpose settings. As Rahaman et al. (2010) contend, this facilitates 
the generation of policy recommendations that can help to improve the design, operation and 
impact of NGO accounting and accountability processes, an important objective given the 
scale of development aid funding which is targeted at countries in the African sub-continent. 
Second, the study of knowledge sharing is an emerging area of enquiry (Foss, Husted, 
and Michailova 2010) and has rarely been examined with respect to the operation of 
accounting and accountability processes generally (for some exceptions, see Busco, Giovanni, 
and Riccaboni 2007; Mouritsen, Larsen, and Bukh 2001; Roberts 2003) or within the specific 
context of the international development sector (Ferguson et al. 2010, 1807). This lack of 
research in the development sector is especially surprising as knowledge sharing is viewed as 
crucial to enhancing the effectiveness of NGO interventions (Ebrahim 2005; Ferguson et al. 
2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007) and the development sector is itself widely characterised 
as ‘knowledge-intensive’ (Korea Development Institute and World Bank Institute 2011; 
Powell 2006). Our aim to increase our understanding of how accounting and accountability 
processes shape the “governance of knowledge sharing” (Foss et al. 2010, 459) between 
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NGDO fieldworkers and their funders addresses this omission in the literature as well as 
specifically responding to calls for more in-depth, context-rich research examining how 
governance mechanisms – such as accounting and accountability processes – shape 
knowledge sharing (Foss et al. 2010, 470; Wang and Noe 2010). This unique adaptation of a 
knowledge sharing framework to the distinct NGO context offers a new and potentially 
insightful lens through which to examine aspects of NGO accounting and accountability 
which are intended to facilitate the transmission of knowledge between different parties 
involved in NGO management, governance and funding. 
Third, prior research has questioned the ability of ‘upward’ accounting and 
accountability processes – the processes through which NGO fieldworkers exchange 
knowledge about their NGOs’ operations with their direct funders (Ebrahim 2005) – to enable 
more effective as opposed to efficient spending of aid funding (Everett and Friesen 2009; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007, 2008; Rahaman et al. 2010). It has also been claimed that these 
processes operate in an overly coercive manner thereby rendering assessments of, and 
improvements in, aid effectiveness more problematic (Awio et al. 2011; Rahaman et al. 
2010). However, prior research rarely bases its primary insights on empirical evidence 
grounded in the experiences of NGO fieldworkers working with local communities who are 
directly involved in facilitating these accounting and accountability processes. Hence, there is 
little work examining the potential of upward accounting and accountability processes using 
in-depth analyses of the actual experiences of those involved in delivering NGO services at 
the grassroots level – where the degree of adaptation of NGO provision to local contexts is 
experienced in practice, and where much of the knowledge for upward accounting and 
accountability processes is generated (but see, Dixon, Ritchie, and Siwale 2006) 4 . This 
absence has led to limited consideration of how NGO accounting and accountability processes 
operate not only to assess, but also to support (or constrain) these grassroots fieldworkers in 
their efforts to ascertain “how things are going, identify problems, prioritize issues, [and] 
develop ideas for improvement” (Wouters and Wilderom 2008, 489). This form of micro-
level research engagement is necessary if we are to deepen our understanding of local 
constituencies’ experiences of accounting and accountability processes more generally, in 
particular the impact these mechanisms have on their daily working lives. This paper seeks to 
remedy this research gap by ascertaining and analysing, from the perspective of grassroots 
NGDO fieldworkers, the scope offered by upward accounting and accountability to create an 
                                                           
4 Rahaman et al. (2010) enrolled a range of perspectives in their study of accounting and accountability in social 
purpose alliances tackling the HIV/AIDS pandemic. These ranged from senior management in major development 
agencies and the World Bank to individuals at ‘various levels’ in NGOs (pp. 1101-1102). Hence, they also placed 
some, albeit not their primary, emphasis on ground-level perceptions.   
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environment where knowledge is shared in a manner that can contribute towards improving 
the effectiveness of NGDOs’ deployment of aid resources5.  
The findings reveal a prevalence of coercive knowledge sharing environments within 
the NGDO-funder accounting and accountability processes studied. Here, explicit, codified 
knowledge (referred to as ‘operational knowledge’) is rarely informed by rich, contextualised, 
tacit knowledge (referred to as ‘situational knowledge’) drawing on fieldworkers’ on-the-
ground experiences. Despite explicit encouragement by funders, fieldworkers are disinclined 
to share situational knowledge. A number of factors contribute to this reluctance, including: a 
lack of funder feedback on the use of operational knowledge shared through accounting and 
accountability processes; fieldworker apprehension about the future funding consequences of 
sharing situational knowledge; and funder inflexibility with respect to the allocation of 
funding. This reluctance is exacerbated by a widespread absence of informal and formal face-
to-face accountability channels between funders and fieldworkers that could create stronger 
fieldworker-funder social ties and more opportunities for knowledge sharing. While we also 
uncover evidence of the recent emergence of more enabling knowledge sharing environments 
within the accounting and accountability processes, situational knowledge likely to 
significantly influence the effectiveness of NGDO interventions remains largely withheld 
from funders. Overall, the findings unveil the nature of the continuing tensions between 
global control and local flexibility in NGO accounting and accountability contexts (see also, 
Rahaman et al. 2010) as well as extending our understanding of how the concepts of coercion 
and enabling (Adler and Borys 1996; Ahrens and Chapman 2004; Chapman and Kihn 2009; 
Free 2007) translate to this setting.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines how coercive 
and enabling accounting and accountability processes can influence knowledge sharing 
between NGDOs and their funders. Section 3 provides a theoretical framework 
conceptualising the factors influencing knowledge sharing and adapts this to the NGO 
accounting and accountability context. Section 4 contextualises the study. Section 5 outlines 
                                                           
5  The data analysed in this paper was collected as part of a research project partly funded by the Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), the global body for professional accountants. Part of the data analysed 
for this paper was included in a descriptive practitioner-oriented research monograph published by the ACCA. No 
aspects of this data have been published in any other academic forum. This paper mobilizes the concepts of 
coercion and enabling within a knowledge sharing theoretical framework in order to transform the practitioner-
focused data into a theoretically informed academic paper. The focus of this paper is also distinct from that of the 
ACCA research monograph in that it specifically examines how upward accounting and accountability processes 
facilitate different forms of knowledge sharing. This transformation of aspects of the practitioner-oriented 
monograph into an original academic study is consistent with prior published work which has undertaken a similar 
process (see for example, Anderson-Gough, Grey, and Robson 2005; Chenhall, Hall, and Smith 2010; Robson,  
Anderson-Gough, and Grey 2001). 
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the research design and methods while Section 6 provides the case analysis. Finally, section 7 
discusses the case analysis in the context of the theoretical framing and considers the wider 
implications of the study’s findings. 
2.  THE NATURE OF UPWARD NGDO ACCOUNTING AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESSES 
NGDOs typically receive aid funding from different donors and use this to provide 
welfare and other aid services to impoverished communities in developing countries. Local, 
community based NGDOs receive this funding from donors once it has been channelled 
through large International NGOs (INGOs). These INGOs commonly have intermediate-level 
country offices and managers in developing countries to distribute the aid funding to 
grassroots NGDOs (some of which will be part of an INGO, some of which will be 
independent from an INGO). The key individuals involved in deploying and assessing the use 
of this funding at the community/grassroots level are NGDO fieldworkers.  
Given the large sums of money allocated to development aid, there is significant 
interest among funders in assessing the extent to which this aid has been efficiently and 
effectively deployed. Prior research suggests that assessments of the efficiency and long term 
effectiveness of NGDO operations are best facilitated through cultures of broad based 
knowledge sharing between NGDO fieldworkers and their funders within upward accounting 
and accountability processes (Ebrahim 2005; Ferguson et al. 2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman 
2007). It is widely argued that this promotes learning environments allowing NGDO 
fieldworkers and their funders to react and adapt to changing conditions in the local 
environments they seek to assist thereby ensuring that NGDO funding delivers the maximum 
long term impact on targeted communities (Ferguson et al. 2010; Powell 2006)6. 
The degree to which upward accounting and accountability processes facilitate factors 
contributing to cultures of broad based knowledge sharing depends on the extent to which 
they exhibit coercive or enabling characteristics (Adler and Borys 1996; Ahrens and Chapman 
2004; Free 2007; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008; Wouters and Wilderom 2008; Wouters and 
Roijmans 2011). Coercive processes formalise highly specified reporting requirements 
                                                           
6
 Development is often conceptualised as a process involving significant change. Without a good understanding of 
the underpinning socio-economic realities, including the perceptions of local people, it is argued that development 
projects are often not viable or sustainable (Powell 2006). The sustainability of development aid projects is 
therefore seen to depend on stakeholders with local, national and international knowledge interacting together to 
share their knowledge (MacFarlane 2006). How and whether upward accounting and accountability processes 
enable this sharing of socio-economic realities has rarely been examined in depth, and especially not at the micro-
level we focus on in this study. 
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underpinned by clear rules and expectations (Ahrens and Chapman 2004). They operate 
largely to constrain individuals (such as employees) and punish them for any failure to meet 
pre-determined targets. They therefore “substitute for, rather than … complement … 
commitment [and] are [largely] designed to force reluctant compliance and to extract 
recalcitrant effort” (Adler and Borys 1996, 69). Individuals are not encouraged to 
independently assess whether a process or project is working well nor to identify and 
communicate improvement opportunities (Adler and Borys 1996). This deliberately curtails 
the use of individual initiative and limits knowledge sharing outside of pre-specified 
requirements, thereby inhibiting as opposed to promoting learning. If, for example, individual 
employees do share suggestions with management outside pre-specified requirements, they 
will often have “no clear idea who will evaluate [them], according to what criteria … or why 
[the suggestions are] ultimately approved or rejected” (Adler and Borys 1996, 73). Coercive 
characteristics prevail in environments where there are large disparities of power, knowledge, 
skills and rewards (Adler and Borys 1996). 
Enabling accounting and accountability processes are more adaptable. They offer 
individuals the flexibility to make mistakes and afford them the freedom to innovate and 
exercise their own initiative. Individuals’ intelligence is enrolled rather than replaced (Adler 
and Borys 1996) and they are encouraged to “mobilize [and share] their local knowledge” 
(Ahrens and Chapman 2004, 296). For example, enabling processes seek to assist employees 
to do their work better by providing regular feedback, outlining opportunities for 
improvement and helping them to prioritize actions (Wouters and Wilderom 2008). 
Interactive dialogue and the fostering of trust between employees and high-level management 
is explicitly encouraged. These processes encourage experimentation and enrol employees’ 
knowledge in reviews and refinements of definitions, data and performance measures in order 
to ensure that these measures are valid and reliable in the context of achieving overall 
organisational or inter-organisational aims (Wouters and Roijmans 2011). Moreover, 
management accept that the formal accounting and accountability processes will always be 
incomplete and that local knowledge supporting or contextualising reporting within these 
processes is of crucial importance (Wouters and Wilderom 2008). 
Prior research indicates that development aid funders have commonly, albeit not 
exclusively (see, Ebrahim and Rangan 2011), developed upward accounting and 
accountability processes that exhibit more coercive than enabling characteristics (Ebrahim 
2005; Ferguson et al. 2010). They usually require NGDOs to demonstrate how aid funding 
has been spent (Awio et al. 2011; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008; Rahaman et al. 2010) and 
require quantitative reporting in rigid funder-specified formats offering limited reporting 
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flexibility (Ebrahim 2005; Ebrahim and Rangan 2011; Rahaman et al. 2010). Prioritisation is 
often given to reporting knowledge that indicates the extent to which aid funding has 
delivered the aid outcomes that have been specified in advance by donors (e.g. Rahaman et al. 
2010).7 While these formal accounts may help donors judge the efficiency with which their 
funding has been deployed, in terms of how much of their pre-specified aid outcomes have 
been delivered to potential beneficiaries, it is widely argued that their primary focus on 
control and justification rarely encourages the sharing of key contextual knowledge regarding 
factors that might enable more detailed, informed assessments of the long term effectiveness 
of the nature and focus of aid delivery; knowledge which could lead to a potential re-
orientation of funder focus and objectives (Ebrahim 2005; Ferguson et al. 2010)8. Moreover, 
prior research also claims that NGDO fieldworkers view the knowledge they are required to 
share within these accounting and accountability processes as being of limited benefit to 
understanding the key factors impacting on the success or failure of development projects, 
given they focus on grading performance as opposed to improving it (Ebrahim 2005; see also, 
Chenhall, Hall, and Smith 2010, 753). 
Some funders, particularly large national development agencies, have made the 
implementation of more enabling accounting and accountability processes drawing on 
beneficiary perspectives a condition of continued aid funding and have provided scope for the 
sharing of this knowledge in their upward accounting and accountability processes (Ferguson 
et al. 2010; O'Dwyer and Unerman 2010, 2007). However, notwithstanding these efforts, and 
despite an absence of in-depth empirical evidence derived from individuals delivering 
services in the field, it is continuously claimed that these processes continue to operate in an 
overly coercive manner on-the-ground thereby failing to encourage the sharing of key 
contextual knowledge between NGDO fieldworkers, INGO managers and donors (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2010; Rahaman et al. 2010). We seek to remedy the empirical gap in the 
literature underlying these claims by ascertaining and analysing, from the perspective of 
                                                           
7For example, if an aid donor provides funds to deliver a specified literacy curriculum to girls between the ages of 
five and nine, then the upward accountability report from the NGDO to the donor would be likely to require 
information that focuses on the number of girls between these ages to whom the specified curriculum had been 
delivered.  
8 Extending the example in footnote 7 above, in some instances where literacy among boys is significantly lower 
than that among girls, and where there are few, if any, donors focusing on male literacy, long-term alleviation of 
poverty might require some of the aid funding currently provided to develop female literacy to be used for male 
literacy. In other instances, a rigid literacy programme might need adapting to take account of local cultural 
differences to more effectively teach students to read and write. Without mechanisms to inform donors of these 
needs and local circumstances, a highly efficient deployment of aid in terms of the literacy programme being 
delivered to a high number of children for a given cost risks translating into a highly ineffective deployment of aid 




grassroots NGDO fieldworkers, the scope offered by upward accounting and accountability 
processes in practice to share knowledge in a manner that may contribute towards improving 
the effectiveness of NGDO’s deployment of aid resources. Specifically, we seek to answer the 
following research question from the perspective of grassroots NGDO fieldworkers: 
How do (upward) accounting and accountability processes facilitate knowledge 
sharing in NGDO-funder accountability relationships? 
To analytically frame our examination of the research question, the next section 
conceptualises the key factors influencing knowledge sharing in conventional organizational 
contexts and adapts these to the specific context of project-level NGDO-funder accounting 
and accountability processes studied in this paper.  
3. CONCEPTUALISING THE FACTORS INFLUENCING KNOWLEDGE 
SHARING IN NGDO-FUNDER ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
PROCESSES 
Knowledge sharing encompasses “the provision of task information, know-how and 
feedback on … procedure[s] [and processes]” (Foss et al. 2010, 457-458). Knowledge sharing 
processes aim to enable knowledge acquired by individuals to become “understood, absorbed 
and used [by recipients]” (Ipe 2003, 341; Nonanka and Krogh 2009). This can occur via 
written correspondence or face-to-face communication with other experts, or through 
documenting, organizing and capturing knowledge for others (Wang and Noe 2010, 117). 
Successful knowledge sharing transforms individual knowledge into ‘organisational’ 
knowledge by embracing extended learning processes as opposed to simple communication 
processes (Cummings 2003; Foss et al. 2010). In the development sector, knowledge 
management processes seek to facilitate and structure knowledge sharing in order to improve 
development-related decision making processes and ultimately strengthen the self-sufficiency 
of development beneficiaries (Ferguson et al. 2010, 1797). 
The cognitive, social and structural factors associated with knowledge sharing  
Ipe’s (2003) conceptual model of knowledge sharing highlights the interrelated nature 
of the cognitive (nature of knowledge), social (motivational) and structural (organisational) 
factors associated with the sharing of knowledge by individuals. It elaborates on four factors 
influencing how and whether knowledge is shared between individuals within organisations; a 
focus we adapt to the NGDO–funder accounting and accountability context studied in this 
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paper. These factors comprise: the nature of knowledge; the motivations to share knowledge; 
the opportunities to share knowledge; and the culture of the overall environment within which 
knowledge is shared (see Table 1). We elaborate on each of these factors below. Our 
subsequent empirical analysis in section 6 focuses on how, and the extent to which, these 
cognitive, social and structural factors are facilitated by and embedded in the accounting and 
accountability processes governing relations between NGDO fieldworkers and their funders.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
The nature of knowledge 
The knowledge sharing literature commonly distinguishes between two types of 
knowledge: tacit and explicit. Tacit knowledge resides within the individual and is largely 
acquired through experience (Blackler 1995; Cabrera and Cabrera 2002; Lam 2000; Nonaka 
and Krogh 2009; Polanyi 1966). It is “tied to [individuals’] senses, tactile experiences … and 
intuition” (Nonaka and Krogh 2009, 636). Articulating tacit knowledge is difficult as it tends 
to “stick” to the knower (Ipe 2003, 344) and is deeply rooted in action, involvement and 
commitment within specific contexts. Tacit knowledge sharing requires close social 
interactions between knowledge givers and receivers (Lam 2000) with ongoing dialogue 
representing the most common means through which it is made explicit (Dixon 1994; Nonaka 
1994). Given the close and flexible nature of relationships between NGDO fieldworkers and 
their beneficiaries, and the often unique needs (to the beneficiaries and fieldworkers) of each 
aid project that they experience, each individual NGDO fieldworker is likely to possess 
extensive tacit knowledge. This influences an often intuitive understanding of their 
development work and the projects on which they are engaged (Ferguson et al. 2010). The 
sharing and use of this contextually rich knowledge in decision-making processes is 
considered crucial to successful development interventions (Powell 2006).  
In contrast, explicit knowledge represents easily codified knowledge, and is therefore 
shared more readily using formal, systematic language. Whereas tacit knowledge represents 
“know how”, explicit knowledge corresponds to “know what” which is capable of being 
extracted and stored independently and objectively without the presence of the knowing 
subject (Lam 2000, 490; Nonaka and Krogh 2009). This tacit-explicit knowledge distinction 
is, however, not a stark dichotomy but is widely conceptualised as a continuum with extremes 
of the two knowledge types located at either end (Inkpen and Dinur 1998).  
Whether knowledge is primarily explicit or tacit in nature, the ‘value’ attributed to it 
has a significant bearing on whether or not it is shared. When individuals perceive knowledge 
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as valuable, knowledge sharing becomes a process “mediated by decisions about what 
knowledge to share, when to share it and who to share it with” (Ipe 2003, 345). For example, 
if individuals attach a high value to knowledge they possess, they may claim emotional 
ownership of it and refuse to share it due to its impact on their status, career prospects or 
individual reputation (Thomas-Hunt, Ogden, and Neale 2003).  
Motivations to share knowledge 
The willingness to share knowledge is influenced by a number of internal and 
external factors (Ipe 2003; Lam and Lambermont-Ford 2010). Internal factors include the 
perceived power attached to knowledge and the reciprocity - the mutual give-and-take of 
knowledge - that results from sharing it. External factors comprise the knowledge sharer’s 
relationship with the recipient and the rewards for sharing knowledge (Ipe 2003).  
If individuals perceive that power comes from possessing knowledge they possess, 
they may hoard this knowledge as part of a control and defense mechanism (Cummings 2003; 
Ipe 2003). Reciprocity can encourage knowledge sharing as individuals anticipate that sharing 
knowledge may be worthwhile to them, even if they are uncertain about what will transpire as 
a result. For example, reciprocity can lead to increased trust between the sender and recipient, 
increased recognition for the sender, or increased expertise for both parties (Hong, Suh, and 
Koo, 2011; Wang and Noe 2010) thereby increasing the propensity of the sender to share 
knowledge he or she might otherwise have withheld. However, where reciprocity is low, 
individuals will be less willing to share knowledge given their apprehension about how they 
will be evaluated based on the knowledge shared (Cabrera and Cabrera 2002; Milliken et al. 
2003; Wang and Noe 2010).  
Reciprocity can also encourage knowledge sharing by mitigating against power 
inequalities in relationships (Ferguson et al. 2010). The extent of these power inequalities is 
contingent on the relationship between the knowledge sender and the recipient. Significant 
power inequalities often exist between funders and NGDOs due to many NGDOs’ reliance on 
limited funding streams for their survival. Reciprocity may help develop trust in these 
relationships thereby encouraging greater knowledge sharing. However, barriers to trust can 
also arise from perceptions that others (in our case, funders or NGDOs) might exploit 
knowledge shared and disrupt attempts at co-operation (Ipe 2003; Mouritsen et al. 2001).  
Knowledge sharing can engender many real and perceived rewards. Individuals 
derive extrinsic motivation through their needs being satisfied from obtaining external 
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rewards. Knowledge tends to be freely shared when it leads to career advancement and 
increased remuneration or, in the case of NGDOs, where it leads to increased or continued 
funding. However, the use of external monetary rewards may exclusively encourage the 
sharing of explicit knowledge which is seen as objective, more measurable and actionable by 
managers (Ipe 2003). While much research deems explicit rewards and incentives as essential 
to motivating knowledge sharing, tangible rewards alone are often insufficient. For some 
professionals, such as NGDO fieldworkers, intrinsic rewards can arise from the work they do 
and formal rewards may be seen as demeaning (Ipe 2003). For example, non-monetary 
rewards such as the development of strong social ties have been shown to encourage the 
sharing of tacit knowledge as these ties can enhance intrinsic satisfaction (Argote, McEvily, 
and Reagans 2003).   
Opportunities to share knowledge 
Opportunities to share knowledge represent structural factors that can facilitate or 
hinder knowledge sharing (Lam 2000; Wang and Noe 2010). Formal purposive learning 
channels and informal relational learning channels both provide opportunities for knowledge 
sharing. Formal channels create structures specifically set up to share knowledge thereby 
providing the context and the tools to enable knowledge sharing to occur. Knowledge shared 
through these channels tends to be mainly explicit. Most knowledge is, however, shared 
through relational learning channels often encompassing unplanned situations drawing upon 
personal relationships as individuals socially interact (Ipe 2003). These channels facilitate 
face-to-face communication thereby allowing the building of trust, which, as noted above, is 
central to enabling tacit knowledge sharing (Cummings 2003).  
While different learning channels offer opportunities for knowledge sharing, 
individuals may find themselves unable to share knowledge (Riege 2005). For example, 
where individuals have weak verbal and written communication skills they may find it 
difficult to articulate their knowledge in a manner that may be understood by recipients. This 
can act as a barrier, as for knowledge to be shared effectively it needs to become 
understandable and usable. Differences in individual national cultures may exacerbate these 
communication problems. For instance, there might be insufficient capture and analysis of 
issues because of taken-for-granted cultural factors which may mean that understanding is lost 
by receivers of knowledge. Barriers of this nature can be significant in NGDO-funder 
relationships as the senders (beneficiaries and NGDO grassroots fieldworkers) and receivers 




Culture of knowledge sharing environment: The influence of coercive and enabling 
accounting and accountability processes 
The three factors discussed above - the nature of knowledge, the motivation to share 
knowledge, and the opportunities to share knowledge - are all embedded in a final factor, the 
culture of the environment in which knowledge is shared. This culture, which comprises 
norms, values and practices within an organisational or inter-organisational setting, influences 
“how and what knowledge is valued, what kinds of relationships and rewards it encourages in 
relation to knowledge sharing, and the formal and informal opportunities that individuals have 
to share knowledge” (Ipe 2003, 353).  All the four factors are interrelated with each factor 
influencing the others in a non-linear fashion. The factors exert different amounts of influence 
on knowledge sharing depending on the setting examined. Moreover, the absence of one or 
more of the factors does not preclude all knowledge sharing (Ipe 2003).  
The nature of upward accounting and accountability processes significantly 
influences the culture of the environment in which different types of knowledge may be 
prioritised and shared (see Table 2 below). In NGDO-funder relationships, highly coercive 
accounting and accountability processes create coercive knowledge sharing environments. 
They construct environmental cultures prioritising the sharing of explicit knowledge 
demanded by funders from NGDOs9. An objectivist approach to knowledge is favoured where 
knowledge is perceived as objective, universal and instrumental and must be taken at face 
value, as if containing some universal truth. This undermines the potential of knowledge that 
is indigenous to context-specific practices, thereby downplaying any role for tacit, 
contextually embedded knowledge that might allow funders to learn from fieldworkers’ and 
beneficiaries’ experiences and insights (Ferguson et al. 2010). Limited reciprocity and high 
power inequalities (Adler and Borys 1996) between funders and NGDOs prevail as a failure 
to share explicit knowledge in specified formats can carry severe consequences in terms of 
lost or delayed funding. This can lead to low levels of mutual trust and weak social ties 
among NGDOs and funders resulting in limited interactive dialogue (Adler and Borys 1996; 
Wouters and Roijmans 2011). In these contexts, relational learning channels remain largely 
underdeveloped with purposive learning channels prevailing and facilitating mainly one-way 
                                                           
9 While we present two extremes of coercive and enabling accounting and accountability processes above, we do 
so only for reasons of analytical clarity. Accounting and accountability processes will possess coercive and 
enabling characteristics in varying degrees. It is therefore more accurate to think of various processes existing on a 
continuum, with enabling characteristics predominating within processes at one extreme and coercive 
characteristics predominating within processes at the other extreme (see, Ahrens and Chapman 2004; see also, 
Table 8 in Section 6). 
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communication from NGDOs to funders. By marginalising alternative forms of knowledge, 
emerging local-level discourses may be silenced and this can prove counterproductive to 
achieving funders’ publicly espoused development aims (Ferguson et al. 2010). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
In contrast, enabling accounting and accountability processes can create enabling 
knowledge sharing environments by constructing environmental cultures affording 
importance to tacit knowledge (see Table 2 above). The sharing of this knowledge is 
motivated by encouraging cooperation within both formal and informal feedback mechanisms 
supported by continual interaction between NGDO fieldworkers and funders (or their 
representatives). This seeks to foster the development of strong social ties and open cultures 
of learning (Ahrens and Chapman 2004; Ebrahim 2005) thereby affording NGDOs (through 
their fieldworkers) an opportunity to experiment and learn from their mistakes (Ferguson et 
al. 2010; Wouters and Roijmans 2011; Wouters and Wilderon 2008). Relational learning 
channels therefore play a key role in support of purposive learning channels within these 
processes. A more practice-based perspective on knowledge is embraced, with knowledge 
posited not merely as a self-contained entity but as emerging in socially constructed practices 
(Thompson and Walsham 2004). An openness to sharing knowledge that is culturally 
embedded and context dependent – situated knowledge - is evident and fieldworkers are 
encouraged to address the choices and opportunities envisaged by beneficiaries themselves 
and to use these perspectives to propose innovative, relevant solutions to pervasive 
development challenges within the accounting and accountability processes (Ferguson et al. 
2010).  
To summarise, knowledge sharing between NGDOs and their funders is deemed 
crucial to ensuring the long term effectiveness of NGDO interventions (Ebrahim 2005; 
Ferguson et al. 2010; Powell 2006). Upward accounting and accountability processes, be they 
primarily coercive or enabling in character, significantly influence the nature and extent of 
knowledge sharing that may occur in NGDO-funder relationships and can therefore help 
determine the success (or otherwise) of NGDO interventions (see Table 2). We mobilise the 
characterisation of accounting and accountability processes as coercive or enabling (in section 
2) together with Ipe’s (2003) conceptualisation of the factors influencing knowledge sharing 
to frame our empirical analysis. This framing is used to help us better understand, from the 
perspective of NGDO fieldworkers, how, and to what extent, upward accounting and 





4.  CASE CONTEXT 
This study specifically examines experiences of NGDO-funder accounting and 
accountability processes in the Northern Ghana context (see also, Rahaman et al. 2010). 
Ghana is located on the west coast of Africa, English is its official language and its population 
was estimated at 24.2 million in 2010 (Ghana Statistical Service 2011). In 2010, Ghana 
received Overseas Development Assistance of almost US $1.5 billion from 19 
development partners - including Canada, USA, United Kingdom and the International 
Development Association (IDA). There is intense NGO activity in Northern Ghana, 
especially in and around the capital city of the region, Tamale, which has been labelled ‘the 
NGO capital of Ghana’ given the large number of international NGOs operating from there. 
NGO activity focuses on assorted areas including health, education and agriculture. 
Poverty reduction programmes using micro credit schemes are also prevalent. While 
poverty levels have fallen considerably in the past decade, about 30 per cent of Ghanaians live 
on less than $US1.25 a day and two million people have limited access to food. The Northern 
region, with a population of almost 2.3 million, is the most impoverished and has experienced 
recurring food shortages. For example, key development indicators, such as child under-
nutrition (12 per cent of Ghana’s children under the age of five are deemed underweight) and 
adult literacy rates are lowest in this region, indicating a significant degree of 
underdevelopment and poverty (Ghana Statistical Service 2011). The Northern region 
provided an ideal field study site to examine issues of NGDO-funder accounting and 
accountability given the range of development issues requiring attention and the  
clustering of a large number of diverse INGOs and local NGDOs in the area.  
5.  METHOD 
As the research objectives for this study focused on understanding NGDO 
fieldworkers’ experiences of upward accounting and accountability processes, an interpretive, 
qualitative research approach was adopted as this emphasises describing and understanding 
the meanings individuals assign to processes (Cooper and Morgan 2008; Doz 2011; Prasad 
and Prasad 2002; Stake 2005). The empirical data analysed was collected in three stages 





Stage 1: Preliminary interviews 
The initial stage of the study involved obtaining an understanding of the national 
context of NGDO activity in Ghana. To gain this understanding a sample of senior managers 
in eight high profile INGOs with significant operations in Ghana were selected from a 
Ghanaian INGO database and sent a written invitation letter to participate in the initial phase 
of the research10. All eight INGOs contacted responded positively and agreed to an in-depth 
interview at their country head office level in Accra, the capital city of Ghana. These 
interviews, which were all audio-recorded and fully transcribed, focused largely on how 
NGOs operated in Ghana and what sort of accounting and accountability relationships existed 
between funders and locally based NGDOs. An analysis of the transcripts and of several 
supporting documentary sources provided us with a detailed background understanding of 
Ghanaian NGDO context. This was used to inform the issues explored in the in-depth 
interviews with grassroots NGDO fieldworkers carried out in stage 2 of the study11. 
Stage 2: Main data collection interviews 
For the main stage of the empirical data collection, we conducted in-depth, semi-
structured individual and group interviews with thirty community-based NGDO fieldworkers. 
We specifically focused on interviewing fieldworkers in NGDOs addressing health, 
education, agriculture and general poverty reduction as these are deemed to be the most 
pressing areas in need of development in Ghana. A letter was sent to the executive directors 
of 31 NGDOs operating in these development areas in the Tamale region inviting them to 
participate in the study. The letter outlined the nature of the study, the names and professional 
backgrounds of the four researchers, and their research credentials in the NGO accounting and 
accountability field. We requested permission to interview NGDO fieldworkers directly 
engaged in delivering services to beneficiaries on-the-ground who were responsible for 
completing accounting and accountability reports for funders and were the primary on-the-
ground NGDO point of contact for funders. The letter stated that the study was being partly 
funded by an international professional accounting body (ACCA - Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants) and suggested some possible benefits that the NGDOs might derive 
                                                           
10 Our knowledge of the local NGO context and of the NGOs operating in the northern Ghana region was also 
informed by the expertise of one of the Ghanaian authors. This author is a Professor in a leading Ghanaian 
university and is a member of the board of one of the largest INGOs operating in Ghana. 
11  As our research focus was on studying the perspectives of fieldworkers working directly with NGDO 
beneficiaries, the data acquired from this initial set of interviews is not explicitly presented in the case analysis 
section of the paper (see section 6).  
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from the research findings12. Ten NGDOs responded positively to our request. In stage 1 
above, we were also introduced to two INGOs’ local partner NGDOs by the Ghanaian 
national branches of the INGOs. We also conducted interviews in these two NGDOs. The 
sample selection was purposive in that the focus of the study was on NGDOs that worked 
directly with beneficiaries (Patton 2002, 230-242). Consequently, interview material from one 
NGDO that did not work directly with beneficiaries but rather acted as an umbrella NGDO 
allocating funding was excluded from our analysis. Overall, the analysis in the paper is 
derived from thirty fieldworkers in eleven NGDOs (see Table 3).  
Insert Table 3 about here 
The participant NGDOs had differing structural characteristics. Some were local 
branches of INGOs, some were local partners working for and with the local branches of an 
INGO, and some were small independent local NGDOs. Despite these differences, all the 
NGDOs received their core funding from either international government Official 
Development Assistance or other international non-governmental sources. Governmental 
funders included USAID (United States Agency for International Development), DANIDA 
(the Danish government’s international development aid agency), DFID (the United Kingdom 
government’s Department for International Development), and Irish Aid (the Irish foreign aid 
development agency). Non-governmental funders included Oxfam UK, Oxfam Novib (The 
Netherlands) and UNICEF (The United Nation’s children’s fund). 
Semi structured, in-depth face-to-face interviews were chosen as the core research 
method as they offer an effective way of gaining deep meaning and understanding from 
individuals working in the field (Patton, 2002). Previous work on NGO accounting and 
accountability has also used in-depth interviews and found them to be successful in 
generating, rich insights from NGO employees (see for example, Awio et al. 2011; Dixon et 
al. 2006; Goddard and Assad 2006; O'Dwyer and Unerman 2008, 2007; Rahaman et al. 2010). 
An semi-structured interview guide was used to direct the conversation during the interviews. 
It first sought information on the role and activities of the fieldworkers; the nature of the 
accounting and accountability reports they prepared for funders; and the nature of their 
interactions with funders and beneficiaries. It then focused on how and what type of 
information was gathered as part of the accounting and accountability processes with funders; 
what information was deemed most important in enabling fieldworkers to work effectively on 
                                                           
12 This letter is available on request from the authors. 
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behalf of beneficiaries (and why); how information gathered was used by them and by 
funders; the flexibility afforded to them both generally and in the accounting and 
accountability processes; how they identified and communicated the needs of beneficiaries to 
funders; and any changes they would recommend to the accounting and accountability 
processes (and why).  
All except one of the thirty fieldworkers interviewed were Ghanaian nationals (one 
was a Canadian national). Almost half of the fieldworkers had been educated to at least 
undergraduate level in Ghanaian universities in areas such as agriculture, development studies 
and engineering. Two had been educated to graduate level in Denmark and the USA. The 
remainder had completed their senior high school (‘senior secondary school’) education. 
Although the initial intention was to hold face-to-face interviews with individual 
fieldworkers, in eight of the eleven NGDOs the fieldworkers attended the interviews in 
groups (of 3 or 4 fieldworkers) and these engagements therefore took the form of group 
interviews (Kitzinger 2004; Morgan, Krueger, Scannell, and King 1998) (see Table 3). The 
interviews were conducted through the English language in the NGDO offices13 in the field 
by two of the authors, both of whom are Ghanaian female academics. They were assisted by a 
male Ghanaian postgraduate student who took detailed notes. Extensive efforts were made to 
create a non-threatening, open atmosphere throughout the interviews. For example, the 
fieldworkers were reassured of the interviewees’ independence, guaranteed anonymity, and 
reminded that they would have an opportunity to discuss the preliminary findings of the study 
in a subsequent workshop (see stage 3 below). It was also highlighted that the interviews were 
not aimed at assessing the professional competence of the fieldworkers but rather sought to 
understand their everyday experiences of the accounting and accountability processes they 
encountered. Throughout the interviews, the interview guide was used very loosely and a 
form of “reflexive interviewing” (Emsley and Kidon 2007) was undertaken in order to allow 
interviewees to pursue themes which were important to them in the context of the study’s 
focus (Gendron 2009; Patton 2002). The fieldworkers were very welcoming, polite and 
courteous. They reflected carefully on the questioning and probing and appeared sincere and 
comfortable when speaking of their individual experiences. They seemed anxious to assist 
with the project and carefully led both interviewers through a large range of documentary 
evidence both during and after the formal interviews. This evidence included all of the 
accounting and accountability reports the fieldworkers regularly completed for funders as 
                                                           
13 These were quite cramped, small buildings. One interview (NGDO B) was held outdoors in a shaded area 
around a table. 
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well as case studies outlining their key interventions14. Extensive probing of fieldworker 
perspectives occurred throughout the interviews 15 . The interviews lasted from 45 to 90 
minutes and were audio-recorded with the advance permission of the fieldworkers and 
subsequently transcribed. Detailed notes were also taken during the interviews by both 
interviewers. Along with the transcriptions, they were later analysed to ascertain common 
themes in relation to the operation of accounting and accountability processes and the sharing 
of knowledge within them. 
Stage 3: Feedback workshop 
The third data collection stage of the study took the form of a feedback and 
clarification workshop, held in Tamale, in which all four authors of this paper participated. 
All of the NGDOs that participated in the second stage of the study were invited to comment 
on an interim analysis of the findings from the study. Eight of the 10 NGDOs from the second 
stage of the study were represented with a total of 24 field workers attending the workshop. 
Participants were placed into six mixed groups (i.e. not all group members were from the 
same NGDO). The workshop was organised to be highly participative. After an initial 
presentation of the preliminary findings of the study by a member of the research team, the 
fieldworkers, in their groups, were invited to review and comment on these findings. A 
member of each group then presented their views to all participants of the workshop, which 
led to a lively forum and plenary discussion. Comments from this workshop were fed into the 
empirical analysis in order to refine aspects of the preliminary analysis. Stage 3, therefore, 
enabled the achievement of several outcomes. First, it allowed the research team to be 
accountable to the fieldworkers. Second, it appeared to advance the knowledge of the 
fieldworkers, many of whom suggested that they did not have many opportunities to engage 
in intensive inter-NGDO interactions. Third, it supplied rich feedback to help inform the 
preliminary data analysis and provided “respondent validation” thereby enhancing the 
credibility and trustworthiness of our analysis and the dependability of the overall research 
process (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010; Huberman & Miles 1994; Patton 2002). 
                                                           
14 All of this documentary evidence was photocopied and both interviewers received copies to take away with them 
for further analysis. 
15 Fieldworkers were also encouraged to debate among themselves when addressing our questions. For example, in 
one group interview (NGDO F) the fieldworkers initially disagreed on aspects of an issue being discussed but then 





As the data was collected, it was analysed inductively, firstly by the two interviewers 
and later by all four researchers. Contextual notes were made after each interview to inform 
the subsequent analysis. In the initial analysis phase prior to the feedback workshop a number 
of recurring themes were identified across most of the interviews. Throughout this process, 
we continually sought out unexpected and contradictory evidence or opinions in the empirical 
data (Patton 2002; Silverman 2010). A set of codes based on the main questions and sub-
questions contained in the interview guide was then developed (Huberman and Miles 1994; 
Ryan and Bernard 2003). These codes were subsequently re-analysed and eventually 
collapsed into the following broad themes: routine compliance; absence of critique; positive 
story reporting; fear of funding being curtailed; knowing more than reporting; working under 
constraints; and pressures and tensions of reporting. These themes formed the basis of the 
preliminary descriptive analysis of the findings that we presented at the feedback workshop 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000). 
Subsequent analysis drew on the feedback received at the feedback workshop and 
focused more specifically on interpreting the main themes in the context of the theoretical 
framing informing this paper. First, we focused closely on the nature of the knowledge the 
NGDO fieldworkers were referring to in their discussions about the benefits and problems 
associated with the accounting and accountability processes. Second, we addressed how and 
whether, in their view, the accounting and accountability processes facilitated the sharing of 
such knowledge. Through an on-going iterative process of listening to the interview data on 
the tape recordings, reading and re-reading the transcriptions and referring back to the core 
literature driving the theoretical framing in sections 2 and 3, an understanding of the nature of 
the processes of knowledge sharing through the accounting and accountability processes 
emerged (Locke 1996). Continual redrafting, reanalysis and interaction between the data and 
the theoretical framing was undertaken to inductively craft the case analysis presented in the 
next section. 
6. CASE ANALYSIS  
In this section, the findings of the study are presented and analysed. The formal 
upward accounting and accountability mechanisms used within the overall accounting and 
accountability processes are first outlined. We unveil two core types of knowledge embedded 
in the accounting and accountability processes and term these operational knowledge and 
situational knowledge. The core analysis focuses on how, and the extent to which, the 
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accounting and accountability processes are perceived as facilitating the sharing of 
operational knowledge and situational knowledge between the NGDO fieldworkers and their 
funders16, leading to more effective deployment of finite development aid resources. A broad 
summary of the case analysis is presented in Table 4 below. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Accounting and accountability processes in practice  
Two main types of upward accounting and accountability reports were produced by 
the NGDO fieldworkers: stewardship reports and performance evaluation (and assessment) 
reports. The main audiences for these reports were overseas funders (see Table 5). The 
fieldworkers were required to provide these reports to evidence how much funding they 
received, how it had been used and what benefits derived from its use. These reports formed 
part of the regular technology of managing NGDO activities (Blackler 1995; Lam 2000) and 
represented the key mechanisms through which knowledge about NGDO activities was 
shared with funders. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
There were two types of stewardship reports – annual and interim reports. Each year 
all NGDOs produced an annual summary report of their activities showing operational and 
financial performance. Some local branches of international NGDOs produced their own 
annual country reports which outlined their mission statements, summarised their core 
activities, and provided operational and financial information about project and organisational 
activities. In many NGDOs, fieldworkers also provided interim reports of their activities 
throughout the year which included details of funds received and their utilisation. Both the 
interim and annual reports focused mainly on quantitative performance measures. These 
included such measures as: the number of clients visited (micro credit NGDOs (designated 
NGDO A and NGDO K (see Table 3)); the number of beneficiaries receiving capacity 
building training (micro credit, agriculture and water and sanitation NGDOs (A, B, J, K and 
E); the number of patients visited (health NGDOs (C and H)); the number of health outreach 
meetings held (health NGDOs (C and H)); the number of women paying credit back on time 
(micro credit NGDOs (A and K)); and student attendance, enrolment and progression figures 
                                                           




(education NGDOs (F and G)). Both types of stewardship report included a narrative 
summary of achievements and, if desired, some discussion of problem areas where activity 
targets had not been met and the “lessons fieldworkers had learned” from undertaking the 
activities (see Table 6). 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Performance evaluation (and assessment) reports were written at specific stages 
during the life of individual projects. Performance evaluation reports were typically written 
at the end of a project or at the end of a funding stream, and represented final summative 
reports to funders (see Table 7). Consultants working for funders sometimes completed these 
reports in conjunction with fieldworkers. Performance assessment reports were written on an 
on-going basis but were much more comprehensive than annual or interim stewardship 
reports. They concentrated on the extent to which predefined project aims and objectives were 
being achieved and encouraged some explanation of the context in which projects were 
undertaken together with reasons why projects proved successful or otherwise. Attention was 
also afforded to issues surrounding project or aid sustainability and the extent to which any 
‘learning’ had emerged from undertaking the projects. This was consistent with an apparent 
overall aim among several funders of obtaining evidence of potential broader, longer-term 
impacts of projects; a focus prior accounting research suggests upward NGO accounting and 
accountability processes ignore (see, O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008; Rahaman et al. 2010).  
 
                                             Insert Table 7 about here 
The nature of the knowledge embedded in the upward accounting and accountability 
processes 
Types of knowledge  
Two significant, interrelated types of knowledge emerged from our analysis. We term 
these operational and situational knowledge (see Table 4 above). Operational knowledge 
represents explicit knowledge about project activities that is general, context independent and 
standardised. It was embodied in the ‘doing’ of projects (Blackler 1995; Lam 2000) and often 
took the form of quantified measures of outputs (such as those mentioned in the previous 
section). Situational knowledge largely comprised tacit knowledge that was context 
dependent and personalised. It was mainly acquired through ongoing dialogues among NGDO 
fieldworkers and between fieldworkers and beneficiaries throughout the information 
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gathering processes for the accounting and accountability reports. It represented knowledge 
reflecting the personal experiences, intuition and know-how of the fieldworkers (Lam 2000; 
Nonaka and Krogh 2010; Polanyi 1966) which was embedded in “their interpretations of the 
contexts in which they worked” (Blackler 1995, 1041). For example, it could reflect 
contextual knowledge about the influence of local customs and culture on the results of 
development interventions as well as areas where beneficiary feedback suggested greater 
attention in interventions should be afforded. 
Value attached to gaining operational knowledge 
The majority of fieldworkers clearly valued operational knowledge even if they 
recognised its limitations for assessing the longer term impacts of NGDO interventions. 
While they often bemoaned its narrow focus on short term activities and outputs, they 
articulated numerous situations where its acquisition for periodic stewardship reporting had 
led to improvements in their work. For example, in the child literacy education NGDO (F) 
output measures attempting to ascertain behavioural changes in children such as enrolment 
rates, drop-out rates, attendance rates, and the rate of student progression to further education 
were widely praised. The process of gathering and writing stewardship reports also forced 
some NGDOs to critically assess their operations and to direct their funding in a more focused 
manner. This led to their knowledge about their development interventions becoming more 
honed while also “helping to standardise [a] common understanding of programmes” (NGDO 
B - agriculture) between different NGDOs based on what they saw as international norms.  
 
[In the stewardship report] we say that as a result of our intervention so many numbers of 
children are being retained who would otherwise have dropped out [of school]. This helps [us] 
to make comparisons with other NGDOs. (NGDO F – child literacy education) 
 
Many fieldworkers also felt that the necessity of reporting and explaining variances 
within stewardship reports often uncovered previously unknown contextual reasons for 
deviations and “helped keep [them] on their toes” (NGDO J - agriculture): 
[One] report was monitoring [standardised] growth … [the variances reported meant] that I 
went to look at how … the farmers [used] some of the tools they were [provided with] [and] 
… whether they were using the tools properly. If they were not, I made some corrections … 
After that, I wrote [in the report] whether they actually used the tools to work at all. Did they 
go to the bush [the farm] at all … and did they need and use the input? (NGDO I – poverty 
reduction) 
Attaining operational knowledge for the performance evaluation (and assessment) 
reports sometimes, albeit indirectly, forced fieldworkers to review projects more 
comprehensively in terms of longer term impact – a focus prior research claims that upward 
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accounting and accountability mechanisms neglect (Awio et al. 2011; Ebrahim 2005). For 
example, one fieldworker explained how operational knowledge gained as part of the 
preparation process for completing a performance evaluation report led to his NGDO realising 
that they had to consider contingency plans for sourcing alternative long term funding in order 
to ensure the continuation of certain projects: 
We held an evaluation meeting which we call KIC (Knowledge Information between 
Counterparts) … during which we became apprehensive about the possibilities of cuts or a 
reduction in funding. So we opened a new bank account to try to get funding from other 
stakeholders interested in the education of Muslim children. During KIC we were able to share 
ideas as to how to handle the situation. (NGDO G – Muslim education) 
These perspectives contrast with prior research suggesting that NGO fieldworkers 
question the value and purpose of operational knowledge used in upward accounting and 
accountability mechanisms (Lewis and Madon 2004; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008; Rahaman 
et al. 2010). Irrespective of the specific upward reporting requirements, the fieldworkers used 
the operational knowledge for ‘internal management’ purposes in order to improve their 
individual efforts aimed at ensuring that their interventions had positive longer term impacts. 
Hence, while the requirement to report pre-specified operational knowledge had a coercive 
character, these fieldworkers used the knowledge attained in an enabling manner which 
allowed them to re-focus their efforts where it was deemed necessary and possible. 
Value attached to gaining situational knowledge 
Situational knowledge, derived mainly from fieldworker experiences and interactions 
with beneficiaries and fellow fieldworkers, was deemed crucial to supporting actions 
proposed as a result of an analysis of operational knowledge or for contextualising operational 
knowledge. Fieldworkers working in mental health, education and agriculture NGDOs 
frequently referred to the importance of their knowledge of beneficiary “capacities”; a term 
used to refer to perceived levels of literacy and understanding among beneficiaries. Working 
closely with beneficiaries meant that fieldworkers developed detailed knowledge of their 
specific needs. For example, the child literacy education NGDO (F) discovered that the 
education process required much longer periods of training for facilitators responsible for 
holding literacy classes than was originally planned: 
We used to build capacities by training facilitators between January and March. Classes start 
in May/June. But the facilitators made it known to us that they would work better if they had a 
longer period of training. So, this year we have moved the training start date to November … 
They can now have 7 to 8 months to build up their expertise before the classes start (NGDO F 




The sharing and (non) sharing of operational and situational knowledge within the 
accounting and accountability processes  
Motivating the sharing of operational knowledge 
Lam and Lambermont-Ford (2010) suggest that individual, tangible external rewards 
alone encourage the sharing of operational knowledge. Our analysis, however, reveals some 
interplay between the intangible rewards fieldworkers derived from their work and the 
tangible rewards available through the receipt of funding. Sharing operational knowledge 
through upward accounting and accountability reports was deemed intrinsically rewarding as 
it allowed fieldworkers to demonstrate, albeit often in a restricted, funder specified fashion, 
how well they undertook their work, which contributed to enhancing their individual status 
and reputations. Several fieldworkers indicated that they were anxious to demonstrate their 
commitment to transparency and compliance; a desire derived from of a sense of duty and 
responsibility to beneficiaries and a fear of being viewed as corrupt and fraudulent by funders. 
Hence, they were content to carefully synthesise and share required operational knowledge 
upon which they hoped funders might build some understanding of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their interventions: 
Information sharing in the reports is very important to us … [It provides] the paper evidence 
of what is going on … It helps to build some trust and confidence between them [funders] and 
us [fieldworkers]. (NGDO C – mental health). 
These intrinsic motivations co-existed with a more obvious set of extrinsic 
motivations influenced by the fieldworkers’ relationship with funders and the tangible 
rewards they received for sharing operational knowledge through upward accounting and 
accountability reports. In Northern Ghana, the dependence of NGDOs on specific funders for 
resources places funders in a very powerful position (Aryeetey 1998; Botchway 2001; Porter 
2003; Townsend et al. 2004). Accountability to funders required specific operational 
knowledge sharing by fieldworkers in prescribed formats following funder imposed rules and 
regulations; hence, it took on a coercive character, outweighing the intrinsic motivations:  
If you don’t meet the [funder’s] exact request in your reporting, they will get fed up and they 
will cancel their funding and drop the children … The child and the community will lose. So, 





The barriers to sharing operational and situational knowledge 
Low levels of reciprocity 
Fieldworkers often refrained from sharing situational knowledge or toned down its 
significance in their reporting due to a lack of funder feedback with respect to the operational 
knowledge they shared. Several complained that funders “never came back to ask for further 
[clarifying] information” (NGDO I – poverty reduction) and “d[id] not account to [them] [or] 
tell [them] what they use[d] the reports for” (NGDO H – support for disabled). Feedback 
about the use and impact of operational knowledge represented an intrinsic reward 
acknowledging the importance of their efforts and  they were anxious to know how 
knowledge imparted was being used to evaluate their work, in particular the consequences of 
these evaluations for future funding. Moreover, in cases where performance evaluation (and 
assessment) reports were written in conjunction with external consultants using operational 
knowledge provided by them, they were keen for reassurance that their efforts were being 
fully recognised: 
The fact of the matter is that there is no mutual accountability from donor[s] ... They are 
willing to listen but whether they apply what you tell them is another thing. To say it directly, 
our funder in [name of country] has never accounted … to [us]. (NGDO F – child literacy 
education) 
Moreover, where situational knowledge had been shared in performance evaluation 
reports, there was a widespread suspicion that funders did not evaluate it. For example, in 
cases where funders did provide feedback on how they had used operational knowledge, 
supporting situational knowledge providing qualifications and explanations regarding local 
conditions was either “lost or ignored” (NGDO C- mental health) with funders focusing 
exclusively on output-oriented performance measures: 
In the end people [funders] … look at the tables and what has been spent rather than the 
message in the narratives. (NGDO C – mental health).  
One fieldworker (NGDO C – mental health) highlighted how reports he had helped write 
comprised a combination of operational and situational knowledge. The operational 
knowledge specified the number of health outreach meetings his NGDO had held and the 
number of patients they had visited, while the situational knowledge relayed a number of ‘life 
stories’ of mentally ill individuals outlining, in the patients’ own words, “what their 
experiences with mental illness [were] like” (NGDO C – mental health), especially the 
problems they encountered in their daily lives. He stressed that the life stories were aimed at 
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“sharing knowledge to help people understand what mental illness [wa]s about from the 
perspective of the sufferer and, [in the process] were used as a tool to influence policy makers 
and funders” (NGDO C – mental health). In particular, the stories sought to help funders 
better understand how and where interventions should be focused as well as assisting in 
publicising the on-the-ground work of the NGDO. However, the stories were never published 
or commented on by funders. They were actually retained on the INGO intranet database as 
specific funding was not allocated for their wider publication. This was seen as a missed 
opportunity: 
At our last internal review, the director was around and he read one of the [life] stories and 
said ‘this is very, very rich and anybody in the public domain who reads it would be very 
interested’. This is because it gives much better information about what we do and about the 
prevailing mental health situation in the country. (NGDO C - mental health) 
Fostering a ‘culture of silence’: funder aversion to unintended consequences and failures  
The perceived lack of reciprocity also left fieldworkers unsure as to what (negative) 
consequences might derive from sharing situational knowledge within the accounting and 
accountability processes. Their lack of strong social ties with funders (or funders’ 
representatives) meant that they speculated constantly about the possibility of penalties (in the 
form of reduced future funding) arising from sharing such knowledge. Part of this fear arose 
from some NGDOs’ experiences of having funding tranches delayed when reports were not 
completed in the exact fashion required by funders. Significant costs were attached to sharing 
knowledge of unintended consequences or perceived ‘failures’ in projects undertaken (see 
also, Cabrera and Cabrera 2002) and it was widely felt that the accounting and accountability 
processes only encouraged the reporting of successes. This fostered what one fieldworker 
termed ‘a culture of silence’ as little explicit recognition or reward was offered for situational 
knowledge sharing. Consequently, fieldworkers frequently told funders what they thought 
funders wanted to hear given the perceived risk that funders might “apply the handbrake” 
(NGDO F – child literacy education) on future funding if too much focus was placed on 
sharing unintended consequences or failures: 
There is a culture of silence among the staff although it has improved over the last few years, 
but I think much more needs to be done … to enhance communication and the relationship 
that exists between the board [of NGDO F] and the donors. For me, I would describe it as a cat 
and mouse relationship, a lion and a mouse relationship actually. Because, they are always 
dictating; ‘if you don’t do it, then we apply the handbrake’ as they say. So, I think that there is 




Many fieldworkers felt frustrated as “the [reporting of] unintended consequences 
[was seen to be] crucial in ultimately achieving [longer term] project aims” (NGDO J - 
agriculture) as well as providing “an opportunity for [funders] to appreciate the key issues [on 
the ground]” (NGDO K – micro credit). For them, a better understanding of ‘failures’ 
provided valuable learning opportunities that could be used to improve the shape and delivery 
of current and future projects (see also, Ebrahim 2005). These perspectives accord with prior 
research indicating that decision-making for development purposes is enhanced when 
“contextually embedded knowledge” gained from local stakeholders is considered and used 
by funders (Ferguson et al. 2010).  
While performance evaluation (and assessment) reports did offer the opportunity to 
reflect on longer term implications and explicitly encouraged consideration of the extent to 
which ongoing learning was occurring within projects, several fieldworkers felt that funders 
were mainly interested in short-term outputs. Moreover, funder reaction to the reporting of 
unintended consequences and failures was seen to be contingent on the nature of the 
challenges posed. If they questioned the core ethos and/or focus of a funder, sharing such 
knowledge risked compromising future funding streams: 
 [N]ormally, what the donor … want[s] to see is the short-term outputs, to see whether it’s 
really worth allocating the next phase of the money. (NGDO E – water and sanitation) 
 
Fostering a ‘culture of silence’: funder reporting myopia and inflexibility  
This perceived culture of silence was seen to be particularly frustrating when it 
prevented the sharing of knowledge through accounting and accountability reports that could 
indicate that the focus of funders’ efforts was misguided. For instance, fieldworkers in the 
water and sanitation NGDO (E) considered their primary funder’s preference for supporting 
rural development a sub-optimal use of funding. They believed that the acute need for their 
services arose in urban areas such as Tamale [the northern regional capital of Ghana]. 
However, they were required to undertake and report on activities related to rural 
development only. While they understood that resources were limited, they wanted some 
scope to use their local knowledge and to exercise their own initiative to enable them to select 
the areas in which to focus their work as this would allow them to use their funding more 
effectively:  
For instance, this year because of the heavy downpour – the rains -, we had problems because 
we were supposed to construct 658 household latrines. But because of the nature of the 
weather - that was around July, August and September – we could not do anything [in rural 
regions] … If we were going to excavate 658 latrines in [name of urban region] we would 
have finished it. The opportunity to determine the district which we should work in for a 
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particular year, we would love it so much. If we had the opportunity, that would be the 
greatest thing that we would love to do.  (NGDO E – water and sanitation) 
 
The perceived lack of funder flexibility and consequent ineffective use of funding 
was a source of considerable frustration. As one fieldworker explained: “[while] the resources 
are limited … we are with the people [beneficiaries] all the time and we know the areas in 
which these facilities are most needed [and] the demand is [much] higher in Tamale” (NGDO 
E – water and sanitation). Due to the uncertainty about funder responsiveness to situational 
knowledge and the requirement to only report on the use of funds in rural areas, knowledge 
about alternative and pressing needs in urban regions like Tamale was not shared within the 
accounting and accountability processes.  
 
Fieldworkers also found that they required more time to educate and prepare 
beneficiaries in rural areas for their engagements which meant that the timelines for reporting 
on rural interventions were often too short and inflexible. It was therefore deemed difficult to 
adequately assess and report on impacts. However, as one fieldworker stated rather wearily, 
“the funders have their own beliefs, their own agenda … and a beggar has no choice … you 
have to satisfy the donor” (NGDO B – agriculture). Hence, this knowledge was withheld from 
the accounting and accountability reports for fear it might deter funders from providing 
funding in subsequent periods.  
However, while situational knowledge was often not shared with funders it was, as 
with operational knowledge, mobilised by many NGDOs to critically assess their own on-the-
ground work. For instance, it was sometimes used in conjunction with operational knowledge 
to guide NGDOs’ internal assessments or ‘audits’ of operational areas that required their 
attention: 
We try to examine what has been the state of [our] work with regards to community mental 
health. How many health outreaches have been held in a year? How many life stories have 
been written, how well have they been written? You know, things like that, and this brings out 
issues that might need attention. Some of the information may or may not be required by 
donors but [we] need that [information] to implement our programme as well. So for us, it is 
like an internal programme audit [irrespective of funder requirements]. Knowledge sharing is 
very important to us internally and we have a centre where we upload all our reports even 
though they are just for internal use [they do not go to funders]… we see it like an obligation. 





Declining funder indifference to situational knowledge 
While most fieldworkers bemoaned perceived funder indifference to situational 
knowledge, there were indications that this was beginning to dissipate. For instance, 
fieldworkers in the NGDO providing basic education literacy to Muslim children (NGDO G – 
Muslim education) indicated how their work had recently benefited from funder feedback and 
discussion about operational knowledge they had reported regarding activities undertaken. 
This responsiveness encouraged them to share situational knowledge through the accounting 
and accountability processes about the circumstances facing different families and how the 
focus of the funding could be realigned to address these (for example, by supporting initial 
educational ‘needs assessments’ of entire families). The funder subsequently disseminated the 
results of the NGDO’s work (encompassing both operational and situational knowledge) in 
the education literacy NGDO community which led to widespread recognition of the impacts 
of their approach. Other international funders then sought to support their activities.  
A fieldworker in the disability health NGDO (H) revealed how he and his colleagues 
were finally starting to develop improved working relationships with their funders. While 
they outlined major concerns regarding the historical lack of feedback they received on 
detailed, contextualised case studies submitted as part of their reporting, some funders had 
commenced providing feedback and offering more support especially when the situational 
knowledge shared outlined key contextual challenges they were facing: 
You know, we are [now] finally corresponding regularly, and there may be certain area 
problems, management problems, financial, anything. So, they [funders] now give some 
support [to] resolve any challenges that we may have. (NGDO H – support for disabled)  
 
 Whilst representing exceptions, we also uncovered some instances (e.g. NGDO A - 
micro credit and NGDO G - Muslim education) where funders had apparently commenced 
engaging in more active monitoring in order to directly assess the effectiveness of NGDOs’ 
actions. This involved funder representatives visiting local communities to try to ascertain 
from the communities and from their observations the impact the funded NGDOs’ work was 
having. The fieldworkers were very positive about this form of ‘audit’ of their work: 
The [funder] now monitors a lot. They will even move down into the community without you 
[NGDO A] to check that what you say you are doing in this place is actually happening. We 
[NGDO A] are happy with this. You want your funders to monitor. They have to come to the 
grassroots and see what we do instead of just sending letters … We want them to know that 
we are actually always with the people and we are doing what we believe we should be doing. 




Certain NGDOs had also successfully lobbied for some flexibility in the allocation of 
funding. This was only permitted, however, if they could show that efficiencies had been 
made within their existing budget. For example, the water and sanitation NGDO (NGDO E) 
was allowed to re-allocate unused funding targeted at latrine construction and mechanisation 
to training services:  
If somebody has been able to make some savings and you explain why, they [funders] will see 
eye to eye with you. It is not that you have misapplied the funding; it is because the activities 
have been carried out and then this was the surplus that was left from this budget line and has 
been utilized in the other area. Before that is done you have to call them [the funders] and 
[make] them understand that. (NGDO E – water and sanitation) 
 
On-the-ground NGDO innovations that complemented funders’ core objectives were also 
beginning to attract funder support; again, only if the innovations came within originally 
allocated budgets. A case in point was the development of a ‘child savings scheme’ initiated 
by fieldworkers in the child sponsorship NGDO (D) which was supported by their funders. 
Although the NGDO had to follow standard funder reporting requirements applicable to all 
countries in which the funders operated, as long as fieldworkers’ suggestions supported 
overall funder programme aims and were approved in advance, they could be undertaken and 
then explained in the narrative sections of the accounting and accountability reports.  
 
Opportunities to share operational and situational knowledge 
The limited role of relational learning channels in supporting purposive learning channels  
The stewardship and performance evaluation (and assessment) reports provided 
purposive learning channels in which structured operational knowledge was shared. While the 
reluctance to share situational knowledge was often based on fieldworkers’ perceptions of 
possible negative funding and reputational consequences (see also, Ipe 2003; Riege 2005; 
Wang and Noe 2010), relational learning channels offered the possibility for fieldworkers to 
informally interact in accountability dialogues with funders (or their representatives) thereby 
providing more scope for sharing situational knowledge. Moreover, where donor reporting 
specifications in the stewardship and performance evaluation (and assessment) reports were 
highly inflexible, knowledge that was previously withheld as fieldworkers felt it did not fit 
within the required formats could be more easily shared through informal relational 
accountability interactions. However, this potential was not historically recognised by funders 
and few opportunities for accountability dialogues existed. This was again seen as a lost 
opportunity for funders to “appreciate the real issues” preventing effective development 
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interventions” (comment from feedback workshop). Several fieldworkers wanted funders’ 
representatives to visit them more often “so that they c[ould] see what [wa]s happening on the 
ground” (NGDO H – support for disabled) and understand the NGDO operational context 
better. Relational learning channels could also provide fieldworkers with information on the 
actual as opposed to the perceived funder reaction to situational knowledge sharing within the 
accounting and accountability processes. 
While relational learning channels were not prevalent, several fieldworkers indicated 
that, consistent with the evidence of dissipating funder indifference to situational knowledge 
above, certain funders were beginning to develop these channels to support existing purposive 
channels. In two instances, evaluations and reviews feeding into performance evaluation (and 
assessment) reports had been carried out jointly among fieldworkers and funders’ 
representatives (NGDO G – Muslim education and NGDO H – support for disabled) thereby 
helping to establish stronger social ties between funders and fieldworkers. A funder of one of 
the agriculture NGDOs (NGDO B) introduced ‘organisational reviews’ using fieldworkers 
and funder representatives working together. While the fieldworkers acknowledged that these 
were far from routine encounters, the face-to-face communication and relationship building 
encouraged them to more readily share situational knowledge that could potentially influence 
the focus of funders’ efforts. As these processes involved “more listening and response from 
the [funders]” (NGDO B - agriculture) they eased some of the aforementioned concerns about 
limited reciprocity.  
Relational learning channels were also evident in fieldworkers’ increasing 
interactions with consultants operating on behalf of funders. For example, fieldworkers in the 
disability health NGDO (H) met with different NGDOs and consultants working for funders 
to discuss general concerns aided by interpreters. Within these face-to-face accountability 
dialogues, they felt somewhat freer to share knowledge incorporating the contextual 
challenges they faced. These channels were sometimes used as a medium where different 
fieldworkers’ common concerns could be shared with funders, through the consultants, albeit 
with no guarantee that their concerns would initiate a funder response: 
We [a group of fieldworkers] were all together with the consultants and we realised that most 
of our problems, our challenges were about the same and the changes we were suggesting 
were all about the same … The consultants indicated [that they were not] here to tell [us] that 
a change c[ould] be made.  They would go back … and discuss it with the donors and bring 
back their comments … They also made it easier for us to communicate as they came with a 





Relational learning channels among fieldworkers and beneficiaries  
While relational learning channels were far from prominent in funder-fieldworker 
accountability relations they actually dominated the interactions between beneficiaries and 
fieldworkers as part of the process of gathering knowledge for potential sharing within the 
accounting and accountability processes. Indeed, in many instances the establishment of these 
relational channels was required by donors. For example, all fieldworkers usually wrote 
performance evaluation (and assessment) reports informed by comprehensive engagement 
processes with beneficiaries. One fieldworker explained that in order to assess their 
‘performance’ they had held an NGDO staff team retreat, a ‘review and reflection meeting’, 
and regular local community meetings (see Table 7 above). They held regular formal and 
informal meetings and discussions with beneficiaries and fed back as much knowledge about 
funding decisions to beneficiaries as possible. However, an ironic feature of these processes 
was that while funders often required the development of relational learning channels between 
fieldworkers and beneficiaries, as we have seen above, the situational knowledge gained 
through these channels was often not shared with funders. Moreover, while encouraging 
engagement, the accounting and accountability mechanisms often only required fieldworkers 
to ‘prove’ that these beneficiary interactions had taken place, irrespective of their outcomes. 
For example, fieldworkers were often required to share photographic evidence of their 
interactions with beneficiaries as opposed to the situational knowledge they gained as a result 
of these interactions: 
You only need to provide evidence that the work is going on. You need to produce a report 
backed with photos as evidence so you only provide the paper evidence of what is going on. 
(NGDO C – mental health) 
 
A limited ability to share situational knowledge 
All of the accounting and accountability reports had to be written in the English 
language. This proved a further barrier to sharing situational knowledge as language acts as a 
“structure of thought and shared understandings” (Powell 2006, 522) and translations 
sometimes fail to provide a clear sense of meaning; although in certain instances consultants 
tried to make this process simpler by providing interpreters when working with fieldworkers. 
Moreover, several fieldworkers confessed that they lacked the skills to write critical, 
contextualised reports which could outline why interventions appeared to be failing. For 
example, the reporting of failures, if considered at all, was often hindered by their limited 
ability to clearly document information about the failures, their implications, and the potential 
learning opportunities they offered. A further limiting factor involved the prevalence of 
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‘development world jargon’ required in these reports that fieldworkers often found confusing 
and time consuming to use and fully understand (see also, O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010, 464-
465): 
We have to put in all sorts of difficult jargon like ‘technical back-stocking’, ‘duty bearers’, 
‘rice bowlets’, ‘empowerment’ etc. (NGDO B - agriculture) 
 
The culture of the knowledge sharing environment embedded in the upward NGDO-funder 
accounting and accountability processes: Coercive or enabling? 
The nature of the knowledge and the various motives, barriers and opportunities to 
share different types of knowledge unveiled above were embedded in the overall norms, 
values and practices surrounding the NGDO-funder accounting and accountability processes. 
Overall, these norms, values and practices facilitated knowledge sharing environments that 
tended to exhibit more coercive than enabling characteristics (see Table 8). 
Insert Table 8 about here 
A strongly coercive knowledge sharing culture was apparent in the lack of perceived 
reciprocity among funders which led to limited “internal and global transparency” (Adler and 
Borys 1996, 72-73; Ahrens and Chapman 2004, 280) about the implications of knowledge 
imparted in the accounting and accountability reports. Moreover, the priority funders afforded 
to stand-alone operational knowledge as the basis on which performance was assessed and 
funding decisions were made offered the impression that situational knowledge shared by 
fieldworkers was not highly valued. This created uncertainty and even fear among many 
fieldworkers who withheld this knowledge especially when it related to unintended 
consequences or ‘funder-defined’ failures. Hence, the fieldworkers’ extensive experience was 
rarely mobilised in support of objectives centred on enhancing the long term effectiveness of 
their NGDOs’ interventions. Consequently, the less restrictive reporting formats inviting 
situational knowledge ultimately failed to dispel the widespread impression that the 
accounting and accountability mechanisms were mainly designed to “produc[e] a foolproof 
system … in which the [core] focus [wa]s on policing adherence to preplanned [funder] 
objectives” (Ahrens and Chapman 2004, 279).  
Funders’ emerging efforts to facilitate more enabling knowledge sharing 
environments were evident in the scope provided in the accounting and accountability reports 
for sharing situational knowledge relaying problems encountered and lessons learned and the 
recent provision of some flexibility in the usage of funds within budget allocations. This 
supported both flexibility and efficiency objectives (Ahrens and Chapman 2004). These 
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developments “reckon[ed] with the intelligence of [field]workers” (Ahrens and Chapman 
2004, 279) and by affording them “more options for action” (Ibid) offered them scope to 
independently address contingencies in the field (Adler and Borys 1996). The increasing, 
albeit limited, improvement in communication processes through the use of relational learning 
channels involving face-to-face funder-NGDO interactions enhanced the opportunities for 
informally sharing situational knowledge that could contribute towards enhanced NGDO 
effectiveness. Fieldworkers also recognised the value of operational knowledge despite its 
perceived limitations and even derived some intrinsic rewards from sharing it within the 
accounting and accountability reports. This helped  create some “local transparency” (Ahrens 
and Chapman 2004, 296) as fieldworkers sought to use this knowledge to improve their 
internal processes. Moreover, despite the fieldworkers’ constant concerns about losing 
funding if certain situational knowledge was shared, there was no history among the NGDOs 
of ever having had their funds cut, although several had experienced delays in the release of 
funding due to the lack of timeliness of their reporting (see also Rahaman et al. 2010): 
When they freeze money for a month it scarcely gives us a chance to develop things but the 
following month they will release two months. So, we still get the money. (NGDO D – 
sponsoring children) 
 
Our analysis also unveiled a tension between the knowledge sharing culture 
underpinning the accounting and accountability mechanisms and the culture underpinning 
development work in general. Development work tended to be slow with contextual factors, 
such as limited beneficiary capacities, often leading to slow decision-making processes. The 
fieldworkers felt that this contextual reality needed to be recognised more explicitly within 
the accounting and accountability processes. For example, a fieldworker in the water and 
sanitation NGDO (E) complained that the periodic reporting requirements of funders rarely 
accommodated the slow local decision-making processes of beneficiary communities. This 
caused conflict when funder accountability requirements meant having to work with slow 
moving local communities while also being required to provide regular upward accounting 
and accountability reports, thereby reinforcing perceptions of a knowledge sharing  
environment in which situational knowledge was not valued: 
I think NGOs are impaired by constraints from above. There’s the issue of timing [and] there’s 
the issue of social impact. I mean if you are involved in development, development takes time. 
But your work is often constrained by these [funder] demands. I think the donors are looking 
for quick fixes, but I don’t think there is a quick fix; it takes time. So [NGDOs] are doing good 
work but your voice needs to be heard and somehow I think we are not being heard [by 
funders] and our voices are getting hoarse. (NGDO B – agriculture) 
We had a case just last year where the construction co-ordinator had to go to rehabilitate quite 
a number of hand-dug wells that we did some years ago…The fact is that the Northern region 
has the highest illiteracy rate, which also affects our performance. It takes a lot, it needs time 
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to actually go through the process for community members to understand the process before 
taking it up. So that’s another challenge that we have. But donors normally think that when 
you go to a community, they would understand and they would do this but it takes a whole lot 
of time. (NGDO E – water and sanitation) 
 
As the accounting and accountability reports were required frequently, many reports 
ended up being repetitive and failed to fully reflect the activities undertaken or the problems 
faced among local communities. The constant time pressure to produce reports meant 
fieldworkers often provided “nice facts in line with donor expectations” (NGDO C – mental 
health) rather than spending their limited time writing more analytical reports that, in any 
event, might be ignored or could cause funding delays. Moreover, as most funders did not 
fund administration costs, the time spent on writing accounting and accountability reports 
needed to be kept to a minimum (see also, Rahaman et al. 2010). 
Now the funds usually come and you have a certain time within which you need to give 
reports on output. Yes, we have been given the funds and in six months time they [funders] 
expect some results. [Regardless] of the fact that you work with [local] institutions that you 
don’t [have] control over, these may be decision-making processes that you cannot easily 
change – you have to work within them … By the time you [get] to work with the community 
and ensure that the decisions are taken for you to be able to move, maybe by that time the 
community would have lost out and they cannot access the particular funds. So, what do we 
do? … So, sometimes when donor funds come with stringent conditions, it is the ultimate 
beneficiary that suffers. (NGDO C – mental health) 
 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has ascertained and analysed, from the perspective of NGDO fieldworkers, the 
scope offered by upward accounting and accountability processes in practice to share 
knowledge in a manner that can contribute towards improving the effectiveness of NGDOs’ 
deployment of aid resources. By mobilising a knowledge sharing theoretical framework to 
analyse the data, a more nuanced understanding of the role and importance of NGO upward 
accounting and accountability processes has emerged than is characterised in prior literature – 
where such an analytical lens has not previously been used. The findings distinguish between 
operational and situational knowledge held by NGDO fieldworkers. Operational knowledge 
represents codified, explicit knowledge about project activities and outputs, whilst situational 
knowledge comprises tacit, contextual knowledge underpinning NGDO performance. Both 
types of knowledge are significant enablers of development (Ferguson et al. 2010) and 
analysing the extent to which they are mobilised and shared in the accounting and 
accountability processes enables us to draw conclusions about how these processes are 
facilitating the effective utilisation of aid funding. While the existing academic literature on 
NGO accounting and accountability is primarily derived from conceptual studies (Gray, 
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Bebbington, and Collision 2006; Lehman 2007; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006) or from 
empirical work enrolling the perspectives of senior NGO or government officials not working 
in the field (Goddard and Assad 2006; but see Dixon et al. 2006), this is one of the few  
studies that has examined the operation of NGO accounting and accountability processes 
using the perspectives of the subjects of these mechanisms. 
Our analysis illustrates that fieldworkers attached intrinsic and extrinsic value to both 
operational and situational knowledge. However, while funders encouraged the sharing of 
situational knowledge in support of operational knowledge within the accounting and 
accountability processes, fieldworkers often felt unwilling and/or unable to share this 
knowledge. This meant that knowledge about crucial contextual factors such as where to 
undertake projects, what type of technology was best suited to local situations, and the 
conditions affecting performance was rarely shared with funders. This reluctance was 
influenced by fieldworker perceptions of: a lack of funder reciprocity; funder inflexibility 
regarding the spending of allocated funding; adverse funding consequences arising from 
sharing knowledge on unintended consequences; and a mismatch between the time given to 
prepare reports and the time required to prepare beneficiaries for interventions. In particular, 
the apprehension about the consequences of sharing situational knowledge about why projects 
failed and the limited feedback from funders left many fieldworkers unsure as to how sharing 
situational knowledge would impact upon their organisations and ultimately their 
employment.  
These concerns were exacerbated by the limited development of relational learning 
channels facilitating face-to-face situational knowledge sharing. Situational knowledge is 
often created within individuals through their interactions and experiences (Blacker 1995; Ipe 
2003; Lam 2000). Hence, the possibility of dialogue within relational learning channels is 
important in making this knowledge explicit. Moreover, as operational knowledge sharing 
through the regular stewardship reports was often seen to be time-consuming, it tended to 
‘crowd out’ situational knowledge sharing (see also, Rahaman et al. 2010). The overall effect 
of the structural and social barriers identified was a compliance attitude within the accounting 
and accountability processes rather than their mobilisation as a system for ‘knowing’ about 
the specific context and unique situations fieldworkers faced. Overall, the fieldworkers felt 
that the limited level of situational knowledge sharing within the accounting and 
accountability processes risked proving counterproductive to funder development aims 
focused on enhancing aid effectiveness. 
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Our analysis develops our understanding of how the concepts of coercion and 
enabling (Adler and Borys 1996; Ahrens and Chapman 2004; Rahaman et al. 2010) translate 
to the NGO accounting and accountability context. The fieldworker perceptions initially point 
to the prevalence of coercive knowledge sharing environments within NGDO-funder 
accounting and accountability processes which focus on gathering, storing and manipulating 
operational knowledge. However, while coercive knowledge sharing environments prevailed, 
we also uncovered evidence of emerging funder efforts to encourage more balanced 
(enabling) environments through the provision of (limited) fieldworker flexibility in 
allocating funding, increasing face-to-face interaction between funder representatives and 
fieldworkers, and the continuing scope for making situational knowledge explicit within the 
formal reporting frameworks. This encouraged the mobilisation of local fieldworker 
knowledge and experience in support of objectives aimed at maximising funding 
effectiveness and revealed certain funders’ increased receptiveness to knowledge that was 
practice-based culturally embedded and context dependent (Ferguson et al. 2010). While prior 
work perceives enabling accounting and accountability processes as simultaneously 
supporting efficiency and flexibility objectives (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004, 298; Rahaman et 
al. 2010; Thompson and Walsham 2004), our analysis indicates that funders are beginning to 
recognise how these processes may also support objectives focused on effectiveness.  
The paper complements, extends and challenges prior research examining the 
operation of NGO accounting and accountability processes in the field. For example, prior 
work continually emphasizes the lack of attention given by NGOs to developing deeper 
accountability relations with beneficiaries through building positive and mutual relationships 
within marginalized communities (Everett and Friesen 2009; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010, 
2007). However, our analysis suggests that fieldworkers are affording considerable attention 
to developing these relationships and that, consistent with long standing trends promoting 
participatory approaches to development, this form of engagement is often encouraged by 
funders (see Ferguson et al. 2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). Nevertheless, within the 
funder-NGDO upward accounting and accountability processes comparable mutual learning 
characteristics rarely exist and little emphasis is placed on the relational work required to 
ensure that situational knowledge is shared by fieldworkers (see, Benjamin 2008, 978). This 
finding lends some support to a growing concern that support for ‘participation’ and an 
openness to creating learning environments may sometimes be co-opted as legitimising 
instruments by funders. It has been claimed that this gives the impression of an openness to 
enrolling situational knowledge in development decision-making while actual development 
practice remains largely ‘top-down’ in its approach effectively adopting a host of exogeneous 
accounting and accountability practices which privilege objective, universal (operational) 
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knowledge divorced of context (Ebrahim 2003; Rahaman et al. 2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman 
2010). This risks reducing “knowledge … to a static entity that can be shifted around to do the 
job of development” (McFarlane 2006, 289, cited in Ferguson et al. 2010, 1800) in which 
funders’ espoused theory of knowledge sharing differs significantly from their theories in use.  
Our analysis reveals the continuing tensions between global control and local 
flexibility within NGO accounting and accountability processes (Rahaman et al. 2010; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). The lack of flexibility afforded to many fieldworkers in 
allocating funding is consistent with Rahaman et al.’s (2010) findings within accounting 
among social alliances fighting against AIDS. However, our analysis is distinctive in that it 
illustrates that not only is the restrictive focus of the accounting and accountability processes 
perceived as sustaining ineffective practices, it actually deters the sharing of situational 
knowledge that could reorient funders’ focus towards more effective practices. Moreover, 
while Rahaman et al. (2010) suggest that World Bank support for AIDS health prevention and 
treatment activities may have deliberately diverted fieldworkers from adopting certain health 
practices, our evidence indicates that some funders are beginning to facilitate more (albeit 
limited) flexibility in funding allocations. 
Our findings accord with prior work claiming that the time and resources NGOs must 
devote to preparing accounting and accountability reports can divert attention away from 
providing essential services (Rahaman et al. 2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008). However, 
despite this, and in contrast to Rahaman et al.’s (2010) findings, the fieldworkers in this study 
attached explicit value and purpose to these reporting mechanisms. For example, contrary to 
the difficulties these mechanisms caused for many of the NGOs in Rahaman et al.’s (2010) 
study, the fieldworkers acknowledged the usefulness of the operational knowledge they 
compiled and shared as it often forced them to reflect on and even helped them to improve 
their operations, despite perceived time constraints. These more nuanced perceptions also 
challenge prior research suggesting that operational knowledge required within upward 
accounting and accountability processes rarely leads to its use by NGO fieldworkers as part of 
efforts to improve their performance (see Edwards 2002; Ebrahim 2005; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman 2007). Moreover, even in the face of the perceived restrictions imposed by the 
accounting and accountability processes, the fieldworkers also used situational knowledge 
gathered to try to improve their work on-the-ground. This apparent, albeit limited, capacity 
for agency on the part of the fieldworkers in the face of funder inflexibility is largely 
unaddressed in prior studies of NGO accounting and accountability.  
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While Rahaman et al. (2010) propose that funders should enrol simple financial 
accounting mechanisms to achieve financial control in order to reduce the complexity and 
therefore the time required to complete accounts, our findings caution against this 
recommendation. Our interviewees relayed few problems with the complexity of the 
operational knowledge they were required to share; knowledge which does not appear to have 
been much more complex than that required of NGOs in Rahaman et al.’s (2010) study. More 
fundamentally, however, our analysis suggests that creating conditions encouraging the 
sharing of situational knowledge in support of operational knowledge within NGDO-funder 
accounting and accountability processes is more likely to lead to more effective aid outcomes 
than simplifying operational knowledge requirements.  
What are the broader, practical implications of our analysis for NGO accounting and 
accountability processes? Prior research has shown that NGO fieldworkers in developing 
countries perceive themselves to be much less powerful than their international funders 
(Aryeetey 1998; Porter 2003; Townsend et al. 2004). Conversely, by possessing key 
situational knowledge about projects, and more importantly why projects succeed within 
particular contexts, they appear to possess a powerful resource with which to combat some of 
these perceived inequities. Through effectively discussing some of the ‘real’ issues they 
encounter within the accounting and accountability processes, they may be able to open up 
discourses necessary for improving development outcomes. The challenge for funders, 
however, is to find a way of motivating fieldworkers to contribute to such discussions through 
creating more enabling knowledge sharing environments within the NGO-funder accounting 
and accountability processes (see also, Rahaman et al. 2010, 1123). Funders need to indicate 
how they intend to use situational knowledge constructively and thereby dampen 
fieldworkers’ concerns that sharing this form of knowledge will necessarily lead to 
punishment in the form of reduced funding. Funders also need to consider placing greater 
trust in fieldworker’s intelligence in order to capture the lessons fieldworkers are learning 
from their on-the-ground experiences (Adler and Borys 1996; Ahrens and Chapman 2004). 
Moreover, funders should ensure that they have sufficient expertise within their own 
organisations and devote sufficient resources to evaluating this knowledge. Recent evidence, 
however, is mixed with regard to whether funders are open in practice, as opposed to in 
principle, to this more enabling form of accounting and accountability (see, O’Dwyer and 
Unerman 2010). 
More specifically, increased attention could be afforded to enhancing fieldworkers’ 
involvement in the development and revision of key elements of the accounting and 
accountability processes, such as the performance metrics adopted. Fieldworker know-how 
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could be enrolled, where possible, in a step by step process facilitating experimentation in the 
development of operational knowledge requirements while also encouraging the 
establishment of relational channels where situational knowledge can be shared (see, Wouters 
and Wilderom 2008; Wouters and Roijmans 2011). Fieldworkers also need to be explicitly 
encouraged to react independently to contingencies on-the-ground (see Adler and Borys 
1996). Such initiatives will, however, only succeed if funders attend to the aforementioned 
concerns about how knowledge shared in the accounting and accountability processes is used 
by them. Not only must funders consider clearly and formally communicating to fieldworkers 
the importance of situational knowledge, they should consider communicating the status and 
implications of any situational knowledge shared (see also, Adler and Borys 1996; Wouters 
and Wilderom 2008). This form of mutual accountability through which funders account to 
fieldworkers for the use to which the knowledge shared in accounting and accountability 
reports is put could go some way towards removing the fears associated with reporting 
‘failure’ or hiding unintended consequences (see also, Ebrahim 2005). While we do not seek 
to uncritically reify situational knowledge, its perceived importance in support of operational 
knowledge appears, from the perceptions gained in this study, to be crucial to improving the 
effectiveness of development interventions. We also accept that we cannot presume that 
fieldworkers are always or fully capable of making this knowledge explicit; hence, funders 
need to allocate funds to assist NGDOs in recruiting and training fieldworkers who have the 
ability to work in more flexible accounting and accountability ‘regimes’ (Everett and Friesen 
2009; Rahaman et al. 2010). 
This study has deliberately concentrated on the perceptions of fieldworkers working 
at the grassroots level in order to understand how the field works from the perspective of 
these on-the-ground informants (see also, Neu 2012). However there are several levels of 
workers involved in NGO accounting and accountability processes. Future research work that 
sheds further light on how upward accountability reports are actually used by the receivers of 
reports is of utmost importance for developing a more complete understanding of NGO 
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Table 1: The factors influencing knowledge sharing 
 
Factor Underlying component parts 
Nature of knowledge  • Tacit knowledge 
• Explicit knowledge 
• The value attributed to knowledge 
Motivations to share 
knowledge 
• Internal factors: knowledge as power; reciprocity (the 
mutual give-and-take of knowledge) 
• External factors: sender’s relationship with the 
recipient of knowledge; rewards for sharing 
knowledge 
Opportunities to share 
knowledge 
• The existence of ‘purposive learning channels’ 
• The existence of ‘relational learning channels’ 
Culture of environment • Norms, values and practices that facilitate knowledge 
sharing 
• Coercive or enabling accounting and accountability 
processes 
 








Table 2: Knowledge sharing factors within coercive and enabling NGDO-funder 




The nature of NGDO-funder accounting and accountability 
processes: 
Coercive Enabling 
Nature of knowledge  Explicit knowledge Explicit knowledge 
Tacit knowledge 
Motivations to share 
knowledge 
Driven by coercion: 
limited reciprocity 
high power inequalities 
predominance of explicit, 
monetary rewards 
weak social ties 
low levels of mutual trust 
rigid reporting demands 
fear of punishment 
Driven by co-operation: 
medium to high reciprocity 
low to medium power inequality 
combination of explicit, monetary 
rewards and intrinsic rewards 
strong social ties 
high levels of mutual trust 
openness to learning and change 
tolerance of mistakes 
Opportunities to share 
knowledge 
Prevalence of purposive 
learning channels  
Relational learning channels operating 







Table 3: Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) participating in                 
the study   
 





Local small independent  Micro credit 3 
NGDO B 
 
INGDO (local branch) Agriculture 1 
NGDO C 
 
INGDO (local branch) Mental health  3 
NGDO D 
 
INGDO (local branch) Child sponsorship 4 
NGDO E 
 
Partner of local INGDO Water and sanitation 3 
NGDO F 
 
INGDO (local branch) Child literacy education 4 
NGDO G 
 
Local small independent Muslim education 3 
NGDO H 
 
INGDO (local branch) Support for disabled 3 
NGDO I 
 
Local small independent Poverty reduction 4 
NGDO J 
 
Partner of local INGDO Agriculture 1 
NGDO K 
 









Table 4:  Case analysis summary: Knowledge sharing within the NGDO-funder  
accounting and accountability processes 
Type of knowledge/ 
Knowledge sharing 
factor 
Operational Knowledge Situational Knowledge 
Nature of knowledge:  
 
Explicit knowledge 
General, context independent, 
standardised knowledge 
Focused on: project activities and 
quantified measures of output 
Tacit knowledge 
Embedded in the personal experiences, 
intuition and know-how of NGDO 
fieldworkers 
Context dependent  
Perceptions of value of 
knowledge: 
Operational knowledge is valued by 
fieldworkers: 
1. Standardises a common 
understanding of programmes 
2. Forces fieldworkers to be 
more focused in funding 
allocations  




Situational knowledge is valued by 
fieldworkers: 
1. Funders request sharing of 
situational knowledge in accounting 
and accountability reports 
2. Contextualises operational           
knowledge and highlights 
beneficiary ‘capacities’ 
3. Enhances fieldworker sensitivity to 
beneficiary needs 
4. Focuses fieldworker efforts on 
medium to long term impacts 
Motivation for sharing 
or not sharing 
knowledge: 
Motives to share operational 
knowledge: 
1. Intrinsic rewards: 
Enhances fieldworkers’ personal 
reputations; facilitates fieldworker 
demonstration of competence and 
trustworthiness 
2. Extrinsic rewards: 
(Coercive) requirement for future 
funding; no penalties imposed  
Barriers to sharing situational knowledge: 
Combination of internal and external factors: 
1. Low levels of reciprocity 
2. Perceived funder inflexibility and 
myopia/ short term focus 
3. Perceived funder resistance to 
learning and change 
4. Fear of penalties/punishment 






Purposive learning channels: 
1. Stewardship reports (annual and 
interim reports)  
2.  Performance evaluation (and 
assessment) reports 
Purposive learning channels: 
Provide some scope to formally 
share situational knowledge  
Relational learning channels: 
Largely underdeveloped between funders and 
fieldworkers: 
1. Few informal opportunities for 
knowledge  sharing  
2. Limited development of social ties  
3. Language barriers inhibiting the 
sharing of knowledge attained 
4. Lack of effective, critical writing 
skills to share knowledge attained 
   But some positive developments: 
1. Fieldworker/ consultant joint 
reviews 
2. Fieldworker/ consultant meetings to 
share common concerns  
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Annual reports  Yes Yes Yes Written Once  Range of 
stakeholders 
Interim reports 
(see Table 6) 




Performance evaluations (and assessments): 
Assessment 
Reports 
Yes Yes Yes Written Continuous Funders  
Evaluation 
Reports 






Yes Yes Yes Written At the end of 




Table 6: Example of commentary in an Interim Report 
Instructions for completing the form:  Please keep as brief as possible. Provide key information that may have a 
bearing on NGO work 
 
Sub-Heading Commentary 
Activity Capacity building workshop: Assertiveness Training 
Objective To build the capacity of 100 women in a selected community 
Target Group Women’s groups 
Challenges Late disbursement of funds 
Outputs Number of women trained 





Table 7: A Final Project Evaluation Report Exemplar 
Headings in report 
 
Example of content included 
Introduction How report was developed; staff retreat, partnership review and 
reflection; team members; length of project 
 
Political, economic and 
social changes 
 
Ghana named as a member of the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries 
Progress against project 
aims and objectives 
 
 
Aims identified; tables provided summarising NGO 
interventions; each objective defined and progress analysed. 
learning highlighted for each objective  





Details about the NGDO 
The future of the 
programme 
 
Plans for the future; direction of new work  
Challenges 
 




Table 8: Culture of the knowledge sharing environment in the upward accounting and accountability processes: A coercive-enabling continuum 
Culture of knowledge 
sharing environment 
Highly coercive                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Highly enabling 
 
Examples of issues 
contributing to the  
knowledge sharing 
environment: 
Fieldworker fear of 
consequences of reporting 
situational knowledge  
 




Priority given to measurable and 
standardised outputs determined by 
funders 
 
Predominance of purposive 
learning channels 
Lack of resources for 
administration functions 
involving knowledge 
gathering and formal 
dissemination in reports 
Funder encouragement of 
formal sharing of situational 
knowledge in reports 
Provision of interpreters by 
consultants operating on 
behalf of funders 
Relational learning channels 
beginning to emerge among 
fieldworkers and funders 
Increasing flexibility allowed 
within budget allocations 
  
Fieldworker fear of 
consequences of 
misreporting or not 
attaining required outputs 
and/or outcomes 
 
Culture of resource dependency 
among many NGDOs 
Low levels of mutual trust  
Low levels of reciprocity 
Little mutual accountability  
Weak social ties due to 
underdeveloped relational 
learning channels 
Language and skills barriers 
limiting sharing of situational 
knowledge 
Trends towards greater 
informal and formal 
interactions among  
fieldworkers and funder 
representatives 
 
  Limited opportunities for co-
operation between fieldworkers and 
funders  
Limited funder flexibility regarding 
fieldworker usage of funds – use of 
local initiative not encouraged 
 No evidence of withdrawal 
of funding (only delays) – 
fieldworker fears over 
funding cuts often misguided 
 
 
  Substance of funder openness to 
learning and change deemed 
questionable 
Restricted resources and time 
afforded to fieldworkers to compile 
situational knowledge –limited 
time for reflection and learning  
 Fieldworkers using their own 
initiative by using situational 
knowledge acquired to 
improve their internal 
operations 
 
